anti-communist right wing of a disintegrating Civic Forum. ODS is closely identified with its charismatic founder, the former Czechoslovak Finance Minister (1990-92) and former Czech Prime Minister (1992-7) Václav Klaus, who led the party from its foundation until December 2002, when he stood down to launch his successful bid the Czech Presidency. Like its smaller precusor, Klaus's party identifed itself as a Western style conservative party defined by issues of post-communist transformation. In the early-mid 1990s the ODS was the dominant force in Czech politics and the lynchpin of the 1992-7 centre-right coalition governments, which negotiated the Such conflicts intensified when, against most expectations, the centre-right coalition narrowly failed to retain its parliamentary majority, continuing as a minority administration 'tolerated' by the opposition Social Democrats. In November 1997 the incipient crisis facing the Czech centre-right was brought to a head by a party financing scandal in ODS that led to the collapse of the Klaus government. Klaus Miroslav Topolánek, a pragmatic politician with a regional power base in the industrial city of Ostrava, seemed to lack both personal authority or a clear political vision, leading to suggestions that Klaus's party might simply become a coalition of local politicians and business interests. 6 As even sympathetic observers conceded, 7 after the 2002 election, the Civic Democrats appeared ideologically and politically disunited and uncertain as to their future role in Czech politics. 7 Despite being in government, the Christian Democrats and Freedom Union (US) also both experienced difficulties. As well as dissolving their electoral alliance, both parties suffered internal splits and changes of leadership related to their collaboration with the Social Democrats. 8 Recent polling has consistently suggested that the Freedom Union's support had fallen below the level necessary to re-enter parliament.
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Assessing the Success of the Czech Right
Overall, the success of the Czech centre-right appears to represent an intermediate case between those of equivalent formations in neighbouring Poland and Hungary.
Despite two electoral defeats and one major internal party crisis, the Civic Democratic Party (ODS) has avoided the organisational and electoral fragmentation and collapse of the centre-right in Poland. However, equally it has failed to gain the levels of support or concentration of the centre-right achieved by Hungary's FIDESZ through alliance building and the absorption of smaller organisations. Although in 1996
Klaus's party absorbed the tiny ex-dissident Christian Democratic Party (KDS) and elements of the influential anti-communist grouping, the Club of Committed Independents (KAN), 10 it failed to take in more significant groupings, even those ideologically close to it such as the Civic Democratic Alliance (ODA).
As in Poland, an ideological and cultural division between neo-liberals and conservatives has represented a barrier to encompassing right-wing unity, although in the Czech case it is the neo-liberal right that is the dominant partner and the conservative Christian Democrats the more minor player. Perhaps more significantly, ODS also arguably failed to maintain the broad alliance between neo-liberals and anti-communists (discussed below) that underpinned it at its foundation. 12 In purely political terms, despite the departure of Klaus and considerable leadership change within the Freedom Union, the participation of smaller centre-right parties in the current coalition governmentitself a legacy of the divisions generated by the break-up of the Klaus governmentfurther rules out initiatives at promoting centre-right co-operation.
Longer term electoral trends also appear unfavourable for the Czech centre-right. As 
Macro-Institutional Factors

Electoral Systems and Strategies for Party System Redesign
Although writers stressing regime legacies dispute its importance, 41 institutional design -and, in particular, the choice of electoral system -is widely considered a crucial influence on the formation of parties and party systems in new democracies.
Since the fall of communism, parliamentary elections to the lower house of the Czech parliament have used proportional representation based on closed party lists, large multi-member electoral districts and a five per cent threshold for representation. 
Parliamentarianism and Successful Right-Wing Party Formation
In a recent paired comparison of the Czech Republic and Poland, Saxonberg has argued that the relative success of the Czech centre right derives, in part, from the absence of incentives for charismatic leaders to pursue alternatives to party formation.
By contrast, the relatively powerful, directly elected Presidency in Poland, he suggests, led a charismatic leader such Walesa to avoid founding or consistently supporting a party. 48 Such institutional effects can be seen as particularly significant, given that, unlike communist successor parties, centre-right parties are typically 'new' formations, which will experience early problems of stabilisation and institutionalisation.
At an aggregate level, there is compelling evidence co-relating weak party structures in new democracies with moderate and strong presidentialism. 49 Anecdotally, the fractiousness and weakness of pro-reform centre-right blocs in semi-presidential postcommunist states such as Romania and Russia confirm this association. However, detailed analysis of the Czech case suggests that, as in other cases discussed in this special issue, such institutional effects may be more apparent than real. Saxonberg is undoubtedly correct to argue that, in both Czechoslovakia and the Czech Republic, strong parliamentarianism and a weak Presidency elected by parliament made partybuilding the only realistic route to executive power for ambitious politicians. 50 However, the implicit assumption that all charismatic leaders were ambitious politicians capable of 'rationally' reading and responding to institutional incentives is flawed. Despite the popularity of figures such as Klaus,Václav Havel was the dominant political personality in the Czech land, having acquired an almost mythic status as a symbol of regime change.
Upon becoming Presidental candidate in December 1989, Havel's distaste for formal political organisation and, in particular, party political organisation, led him to break all contact with the Civic Forum movement he had co-founded. Thereafter, he made no direct intervention in the movement's internal affairs until September 1990 and also declined to stand for the movement's Chairmanship -a post he himself had proposed -which he would arguably have won without difficulty. Havel's 'irrational' behaviour in refusing to seek power through involvement with a political party thus opened the way for the 'more rational' Klaus to win the post. This suggests that a more critical factor in explaining successful party formation are the cognitive frameworks through which new political élites approach post-transition politics.
Micro-Institutional Factors
The hours before the election for the Chairmanship of Civic Forum, which was to launch his career as a party leader, a reluctant Klaus had to be persuaded to stand. 55 
The Decline of the Czech Centre-Right as Problem of Institutionalisation
A newly founded political party can be regarded as an organisational solution to a collective action problem, in which participants (members, voters) exchange resources (financial, material, technical, time) to generate political outcomes which would not be achievable individually. A party becomes organisationally stabilised relatively quickly when such resource flows and exchanges are regularised and settle into some kind of equilibrium. In the longer term, however, members and voters may begin to identify with the party to such an extent that the party is seen as an end in itself, leaving behind the instrumental goals of its founders and initial supporters.
Such a process -and the air of permanence and durability it produces -is widely termed institutionalisation. 56 ODS's formation (and its own view of its formation) was as a rational response to the problem of co-ordinating and mobilizing political support for market reform and other policies. By the mid-1990s ODS had (seemingly) delivered these public goods and had at the same time stabilised itself organisationally, acquiring enough votes and resources to sustain itself and maintaining a rough balance between internal interests, competing élites and élite and and grassroots actors. However, despite generating electoral support and a degree of voter identification unusual for a 'new' party in East and Central Europe, the party could not be regarded as institutionalized in the sense described above. ODS's internal party crisis of the mid-1990s, which culminated in the split of 1997-98 represented a breakdown in the institutionalisation process.
Paradoxically, this breakdown was caused by the same factors that had initially allowed ODS to form and stabilise so quickly and so successfully: charismatic leadership, internally democratic organisation and ideological militancy. In choosing to support Klaus almost regardless of the circumstances of the funding scandal or the party's record in office, the majority of ODS members in effect chose to make the party a formation based increasingly on a bond of trust with its charismatic founder and leader. Rather than outgrowing its charismatic founder, the crisis saw the reassertion of Václav Klaus's personal authority and prominence allowing him to develop his personal policy agendas (on, for example, Europe) without being checked by the rival élites. ODS was both too stable to expand the centre-right through party breakdown -the model described by Fowler in the case of the MDF and FIDESZand too weakly institutionalised to expand through a more normal process of replacing its leadership, renewing its ideology and identity and embracing new alliance-building tactics. Slovak party system, the fragmented Czech left was cut off from more economically populist Slovak parties with which it might have made common cause. 58 Six years on, the 1998 election marked a further critical juncture for the Czech centreright. In its 1998 election campaign ODS had called for a mobilisation of its supporters against a centre-left, which it once again depicted as a danger to reform and democratic development. However, when the election results failed to produce a viable majority government -principally, because of the Freedom Union's unwillingness to enter a coalition with either ODS or the Social Democrats -Václav
Critical Elections as Critical Junctures
and 1998: From Breaking the Left to Braking the Left
Klaus. The Agreement and its successor, the Patent of Toleration, were formal pacts, which committed ODS to support the continuation in office (but not all the legislation of) a minority Social Democratic government. The agreements also guaranteed ODS key posts in parliament and (informally) in the management structures of public bodies. As noted above, the two signatories also agreed to enact a number of mutually beneficial constitutional and legislative changes, principally electoral reform.
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ODS justified the Opposition Agreement as a pragmatic and realistic arrangement, which would maintain political stability and exercise a 'braking' effect on the Social Democrats. In this view, the Agreement did not mark the suspension of left-right competition, but merely transferred it to a new setting. 60 Critics saw it as a cynical exercise in clientelistic power politics, which made a nonsense of pretended ideological divisions. 61 Such discussions are, however, beyond the scope of this Wenceslas Day Agreement' of 28 September 1999 thus pledged it to 'tackling political drift (marasmus), effectively countering growing communist influence, solving our country's current problems and leading it to the European Union'. 64 As
Lux had anticipated in 1998 before leaving politics through illness, the grouping also 67 This suggested that the Quad-Coalition, whose leaders supported both protests and sought to collaborate with the civic initiatives that had organised them, might be able to form a wider societal coalition to articulate a powerful public mood for change.
However, almost from its inception, 4K was undermined by divisions of the type that that had plagued similar centre-right coalition groupings in Poland and Slovakia.
These centred on rivalries between member parties, aggravated by their disproportionate size, and the weakness of coalition leadership structures to enforce decisions. Politicians in the four member parties were inconsistent and divided as over the extent to which 4k should be integrated into a single party or bloc. In the case of 4k, it was the strongest coalition partner, the Christian Democrats (KDU-ČSL), whose mass membership, long party tradition and distinct electorate, marked it out from other smaller, liberal and anti-communist coalition members, that became a source of instability. Rival factions within KDU-ČSL tended to use the coalition framework as an additional means of pursuing their own intra-party conflict. 68 More significantly, however, the Christian Democrats became increasingly unwilling and unable to meet 
Political Agents and Political Agency
The 'Klaus Phenomenon' 
